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Abstract
This study investigates whether and how CEO ownership impacts firm performance by
using the large tax cut on individual dividend income enacted in 2003 (The 2003 Dividend Tax
Cut) as an exogenous shock. My findings suggest that CEO ownership of dividend payers
significantly increased after the shock in the form of higher annual restricted stock grants and
more option exercises. I document that the change in CEO ownership has an asymmetric impact
on firm performance and investment efficiency. Only dividend payers with CEOs who moved
closer to optimal ownership experienced improvement in investment efficiency and performance.
In contrast, dividend payers with CEOs who moved further away from optimal ownership
experienced lower investment efficiency and had poorer performance. Overall, my findings
provide insights to the design and efficacy of CEO compensation by showing that changes in
CEO ownership lead to changes in firm performance.
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1. Introduction
Does Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity ownership affect firm performance? While
this question has received considerable attention in economics, finance and accounting research,
it remains an open question. Studies on this issue employ two very different perspectives. One
the one hand, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) assume that managerial ownership is endogenously
determined. When contracting, firms would choose optimal ownership levels for their managers
in accordance with the characteristics of the firms and the environment. Since the ownership is
set at optimal, there should not be any relation between change in managerial ownership and
change in firm performance. The empirical evidence in Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999)
and in Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2012) suggest that the relation between managerial
ownership and firm performance is insignificant. They argue that their findings are consistent
with the theoretical prediction in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that firms optimally choose
managerial ownership to maximize firm value when they contract with their CEOs. On the other
hand, the incentive alignment hypothesis in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the managerial
entrenchment hypothesis in Stulz (1988) suggest that higher equity ownership is associated with
better incentive alignment and lower entrenchment. Consistent with this prediction, Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find a non-linear relation between managerial ownership and firm
performance.
Core and Guay (1999) attempt to reconcile these two perspectives and propose an
alternative approach by relaxing some of the strong assumptions underlying these perspectives.
They argue that firms choose optimal managerial incentives when they initially contract with
managers. However, there is deviation from these optimal ownership levels over time due to high
adjustment costs of continuously re-contracting. Thus, firm performance is expected to improve
1

when firms re-optimize managerial ownership to move managerial ownership closer to its
optimal level.
Consistent with the Core and Guay approach, prior research documents that firms that recontract with their CEOs improve CEO’s incentives and firm performance. Core and Larcker
(2002) examine a sample of firms that adopt “target ownership plans”, under which executives
are required to increase their equity ownership. Their findings suggest that after the adoption of
these plans executive ownership increases significantly and these firms experience significant
improvement in operating and stock performance. Cheng and Farber (2008) document that the
proportion of CEOs’ compensation in stock options declines significantly in the two years
following earnings restatements. This reduction is followed by a decrease in the riskiness of
investments and subsequent improvement in operating performance.
However, the findings about performance improvement after changes in executive
ownership are subject to sample selection bias (Core and Larcker 2002, p.333; Cheng and Farber
2008, p.1244). Using econometric methods such as a matched sample or the Heckman (1979)
two-stage procedure only mitigates the sample selection bias. Given the absence of exogenous
variation, findings from prior research are subject to the criticism that the cross-sectional
correlation between executive compensation and firm performance may reflect unobservable
characteristics that generate both compensation policy and firm performance. A key contribution
of my study is that I use an exogenous shock in the relative cost of holding equity that arises
from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut (DTC) to examine the relation between managerial ownership
and firm performance. Doing so allows me to draw stronger inferences compared to prior
research.
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In this paper, I use a large tax cut on individual dividend income enacted in the 2003
DTC included in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act in 2003 as an unexpected
and exogenous shock to investigate the association between CEO ownership and firm
performance. Specifically, I aim to answer two main research questions. First, did CEO
ownership increase after the 2003 DTC? Second, if CEO ownership did increase following the
DTC, did this lead to improved firm performance?
The 2003 DTC significantly reduced the cost of receiving dividends for high income
shareholders and thus increased the value of the stock holdings of firms that pay dividends
(dividend payers). A reduction of individual dividend income tax from a top rate of 38.6 percent
to 15 percent increased the after-tax value of a $1 dividend of a high income shareholder from
61.4 cents to 85 cents, a 38 percent increase. Due to this favorable tax treatment, the value of
dividend paying stocks increased significantly. I therefore expect that the 2003 DTC provided
incentives for CEOs to hold higher equity ownership and for firms to grant more equity.
Generally, changes in CEO ownership come from four channels: (1) new restricted stock grants;
(2) new stock option grants; (3) vested option exercises by CEOs; and (4) CEO trading in the
open market, including share sales and purchases. Changes in the first two channels are
completed by the board of directors, while changes in the last two channels are completed by the
CEOs. To provide more insights about how the 2003 DTC affected CEO ownership, I examine
changes in CEO ownership associated with each of these four channels.
Using a balanced sample of 247 dividend payers and 297 non-dividend payers (as a
control group) between the period 2002 and 2004 that have non-missing data for research and
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development expenditures (R&D)1, I find that CEO ownership of dividend payers significantly
increased from 6.73 percent in 2002 to 11.41 percent in 2004 through higher restricted stock
grants, more option exercises and higher net purchases. Dividend payers re-contracted with their
CEOs in 2004 by granting more restricted stock ($417,738 increased in new restricted stock
grant value, which is equivalent to 4.08 percent of total compensation) but fewer stock options
($753,680 decreased in new option grant value, which is equivalent to 11.22 percent of total
compensation).2 From 2002 to 2004, CEOs of dividend payers exercised $2,612,540 more
options and owned $6,413,440 more shares. This finding is in line with Aboody and Kasznik
(2008) who find that firms with higher percentage of ownership by individual shareholders
substitute restricted stock grants for option grants to induce managers to pay dividends.
After finding that the 2003 DTC did have positive impact on CEO ownership, I move on
to examine the second research question, whether an increase in CEO ownership leads to
improvement in firm performance. I follow the theoretical framework of Core and Guay (1999)
and Core and Larcker (2002) and expect that more optimal ownership is associated with
improvement in firm performance. A higher CEO ownership does not always leads to better
performance. The risk associated with stock performance for CEOs is higher than outside
investors because CEOs also have human capital and undiversified stock holdings of their own
firms (Ofek and Yermack 2000). Therefore, a higher equity ownership might deter a CEO from

1

I select the sample with no-missing data on R&D to serve two purposes. First, executive ownership plays
significantly more important role in firms operating in noisier environment, has a significant amount of intangible
assets and exposes to riskier investments such as research and development (Demsetz and Lehn 1985, p.1158-1160).
Thus, using R&D investment sample provide stronger setting to examine the role of CEO ownership on firm
performance. Second, using R&D investment sample allows me to examine the change in risk-taking behavior of
CEOs measured as the change in R&D investment and the direct outcome of their R&D investment measured as the
number patents granted (i.e. investment efficiency).
2
A reduction in option grants is expected because both restricted stock and stock options provide equity incentives,
but only stock holders receive any dividend paid on the stock whereas stock option holders do not receive the
dividends until they exercise and hold the stock.
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investing in risky investment projects, such as R&D investment, even though those projects
might have positive net present values.
First, I follow Core and Larcker (2002) to compute an ownership benchmark by
constructing a regression model comparable to the models used by Himmelberg, Hubbard and
Palia (1999) and Core and Larcker (2002), in which the dependent variable in the regression is
the natural logarithm of CEO ownership. I used the change in optimal ownership deviation
(Deviation) from 2002 and 2004 to determine whether an increase in equity ownership moves the
CEO closer to or further from the optimal ownership level. Specifically, I use the difference
between the absolute values of Deviation in 2002 and 2004 to separate the 247 dividend payers
into two subsamples: More Optimal (114 CEOs) and Less Optimal (133 CEOs). CEOs belong to
the More Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is greater than the
absolute value of Deviation in 2004. CEOs belong to Less Optimal subsample if the absolute
value of Deviation in 2002 is less than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004. Prior to the shock
of the 2003 DTC, CEOs in the More Optimal subsample under-owned their firms while CEOs in
the Less Optimal subsample over-owned their firms. An increase in ownership after the 2003
DTC shock moved the CEOs in the More Optimal subsample closer to the optimal ownership
levels but moved the CEOs in the Less Optimal subsample further from the optimal ownership
levels.
Next, I examine whether more optimal ownership is associated with improvement in
investment and firm performance. I examine the change in CEOs’ risk taking behavior measured
by the levels of R&D investment and the investment efficiency measured by the number of
patents granted scaled by R&D investment. I first document a significant negative associated
between changes in CEO ownership and changes in R&D investment and the negative
5

association is more significant in the Less Optimal subsample. To conduct tests of changes in
investment efficiency (IE), I follow Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li (2013) and define IE as a firm’s
ability to generate patents per dollar of R&D. I allow a two-year lag between changes in R&D
and patents granted because, on average, it takes two years for the United Stated Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) to grant a patent application (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001). I
measure IE in 2006 and 2007 as the ratio of the total number of patents granted in 2006 and 2007
to the total accumulated R&D investments in 2004 and 2005, respectively. I find that only
dividend payers in the More Optimal subsample experienced a significant improvement in
investment efficiency. In contrast, dividend payers in the Less Optimal subsample experienced a
reduction in investment efficiency.
Finally, I examine the change in firm performance of dividend payers in 2006 and 2007
and find that dividend payers in the More Optimal subsample consistently outperformed the
operating performance measured as return to assets (ROA) of their benchmark firms by the mean
of 1.38 and 1.95 percentage points in 2004 and 2005, respectively. In contrast, dividend payers in
the Less Optimal subsample underperformed their benchmark firms’ ROA in both 2004 and
2005. The results using stock return performance measured by 12- and 24-month buy-and-hold
returns (BHAR) also suggest that more optimal ownership is associated with improvement in
firm performance. Dividend payers in the More Optimal subsample beat their benchmark
portfolios by the mean of 5.36 percent in 12-month BHAR and 7.57 percent in 24-month BHAR
while dividend payers in the Less Optimal subsample insignificantly under-performed their
benchmark portfolios. Overall, these findings suggest that more optimal ownership is associated
with more efficient investment decisions and improvement in firm performance.
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This paper contributes to the extant literature in several important ways. First, and most
importantly, this paper extends the literature on the relation between managerial equity
ownership and firm performance. Using the 2003 DTC as an exogenous shock that provides a
stronger econometric identification of the relation between managerial ownership and firm
performance, I find that CEO ownership of dividend payers significantly increased after the 2003
DTC and that a movement toward a more optimal level of CEO ownership is significantly
associated with more efficient R&D investment and better firm performance. My finding that
there is a significant association between changes in CEO ownership and firm performance sheds
light on the debate about whether managerial ownership has any impact on firm performance
(e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 1999; Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1988; Core and Guay 1999; Core and Larcker 2002).
Second, I provide empirical evidences on four different channels through which CEO
ownership of dividend payers changed after the 2003 DTC: (1) new restricted stock grants; (2)
new stock option grants; (3) option exercises; and (4) trading in open-market including share
sales and purchases. My findings that dividend payers re-contract with their CEOs and rewarded
more restricted stocks and reduced stock option grants are in line with the evidences documented
in Aboody and Kasznik (2008). However, my study is different from Aboody and Kasznik
(2008) because my focus is on the association between total CEO ownership and firm
performance while Aboody and Kasznik (2008) focus on the association between annual equity
grants and the total level of dividend payment. Aboody and Kasznik (2008) do not examine the
impact of the 2003 DTC on CEO ownership through option exercises or trading in open-market.
Third, my findings that higher CEO ownership has an asymmetric impact of risky
investment extend the findings documented in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). In that study,
7

the authors document a strong causal relation between managerial equity incentives and
investment policy. They find that CEOs with higher option holdings, implying higher risk
sensitivity to stock volatility, implement more investment in R&D. I find that although dividend
payers in the More and Less Optimal subsamples both significantly reduced option grants after
the 2003 DTC, only dividend payers in the Less Optimal subsample reduced their investment in
R&D. My results suggest that the level of total CEO ownership and the distance to optimal
ownership levels are important determinants of R&D investment policy. Furthermore, I directly
test and provide evidence that more optimal ownership is also associated with more efficient
R&D investment.
Last but not least, this study extends a growing literature on the impact of dividend taxes
on corporate decisions. Prior search investigates the impact of the 2003 TDC on corporate
payout structure (Chetty and Saez 2005, 2006; Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner 2007; Brav et al.
2008 and Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford 2011), market responses to dividend announcements
and payments (Chetty, Rosenberg, and Saez 2005, Amromin, Harrison an Sharpe 2008), cost of
equity capital of dividend payers (Auerbach and Hassett 2005, Dhaliwal, Krull and Li 2007 and
Dai et al. 2013), tangible investment in capital expenditure (Campbell et al 2013) and the
structure of CEO annual compensation (Aboody and Kasznik 2008 and Shevlin 2008). My study
extends this stream of literature by investigating the impact of the 2003 DTC on total CEO
ownership, as well as the economic consequences of these changes. To my best knowledge, this
is the first study to examine the impact of the 2003 DTC on total equity ownership of CEOs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide an overview
of the related literature and develop my hypotheses. In Section 3, I present my sample and data.
Section 4 reports the empirical results for the change CEO equity ownership following the 2003
8

DTC. In Section 5, I report empirical results for the impact of changes in CEO equity ownership
on investment and firm performance. I summarize and conclude in Section 6.

9

2. Prior Research and Hypothesis Development
This paper is related to prior studies that investigate the association between managerial
equity ownership and firm performance and to the research that documents the impacts of the
2003 DTC on corporate behavior. Below, I briefly review these studies and develop my
hypotheses for the change in CEO ownership after the 2003 DTC and then the economic
consequences of changes in CEO ownership on firm performance.
2.1. Prior Literature on Executive Ownership and Firm Performance
The extant literature on the association between executive ownership and firm
performance documents mixed evidence. On the one hand, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) predict that
there is no relation between executive ownership and firm performance if firms can continuously
re-contract. Their empirical evidence indicates that executive ownership is determined by firm
performance, not vice-versa. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) argue that fixed effects
should be used when estimating the association between executive ownership and firm
performance. Their findings indicate that after controlling for firm fixed effects, there is no
relation between executive ownership and firm subsequent performance. Coles, Lemmon and
Meschke (2012) employ a structural model approach to re-examine the association between
executive ownership and firm performance and document evidences that are in line with
conclusions of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999).
On the other hand, the incentive alignment hypothesis in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
the managerial entrenchment hypothesis in Stulz (1988) suggest that higher equity ownership is
associated with better incentive alignment and lower entrenchment. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988) assume that firms cannot contract optimally with their managers because the adjustment
10

costs of re-contracting are so great. Consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis of Jensen
and Meckling (1976) and the managerial entrenchment of Stulz (1988), Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1988) find a nonlinear and significant relationship between managerial ownership and
firm performance (measured as Tobin’s Q). They find that Tobin’s Q first increases (when
managerial ownership is less than 5 percent), then declines (when managerial ownership is
between 5 percent and 25 percent), and finally rises slightly as the managerial ownership
increases. Zhou (2001) provides insightful comments on the fixed approach proposed in
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999). Zhou argues that although managerial ownership is
substantially different across firms, the change in managerial ownership is slow from year to
year within a company. By relying on time-series variation within a company, fixed effects
estimators may not detect an effect of ownership on subsequent performance even when such a
relation exists.
Core and Guay (1999) reconcile these two schools of thought and propose an alternative
approach by relaxing some of the strong assumptions. They argue that firms choose optimal
managerial incentives when they contract. However, overtime firms deviate from these optimal
ownership levels due to high adjustment costs of continuously re-contracting. Thus, we would
expect firm performance improvement when firms re-contract with their managers to move
managerial ownership closer to optimal levels.
Core and Guay (1999) develop a model for the optimal level of CEO equity ownership
and find that the optimal portfolio of incentives from stock and options varies with the
hypothesized economic determinants specified in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) such as firm size,
growth opportunities, and proxies for monitoring costs. CEO ownership gradually deviates from
optimal levels, either because the optimal levels shift or because of changes in the incentives
11

provided by CEO stock and option portfolios. Core and Guay (1999) also provide empirical
evidence that firms not only set an optimal level of CEO incentives but also actively manage
toward this level by varying incentive grants to correct deviations from these optimal incentive
levels. Tong (2008) uses two events - share issuance and share repurchase, to examine the impact
of executive ownership on subsequent performance. The implication is that share issuance
(repurchase) will dilute (raise) the percentage of executive ownership. However, one limitation
of Tong (2008) is that the decisions to issue or repurchase shares are also endogenously
determined within firms and therefore the interpretation of his findings is constrained.
Core and Larcker (2002) and Cheng and Farber (2008) exploit the advantage of being
able to find a set of firms that highlight the suboptimal level of CEO ownership to examine the
relation between equity ownership and firm performance. Core and Larcker (2002) use a sample
of firms that adopt “target ownership plans”, under which mangers are required to increase their
ownership levels (the implicit assumption is that these managers previously under-owned their
firms), and show that an increase in managerial equity ownership is significantly associated with
improvement in subsequent performance (measured as returns on assets and stock returns).
Cheng and Farber (2008) use a sample of earnings restatement firms to examine whether firms
re-contract with their CEOs in post-restatement years to adjust managerial equity incentives
toward optimal levels. Their findings suggest that restatement firms re-contract with their CEOs
by reducing option-based compensation and that more optimal incentives lead to significant
improvement in subsequent performance. Although both Core and Larcker (2002) and Cheng
and Farber (2008) find a significant association between managerial ownership and firm
performance, the association is in opposite directions. Core and Larcker (2002) find that higher
equity ownership (measured by stock ownership) is followed by better performance. In contrast,
12

Cheng and Farber (2008) document that lower equity ownership (measured by lower option
grants) is followed by better performance. The explanation for these divergent findings lies in the
sample selection of each study. The sample in Core and Larcker (2002) include firms with
managers who under-own their firms while the sample in Cheng and Farber (2008) include firms
with managers who over-own their firms. It is worth to note that neither of these studies
explicitly examines how the relative distance to optimal ownership levels affects firm subsequent
performance.
Moreover, the findings about performance improvement after the change in executive
ownership of Core and Larcker (2002) and Cheng and Farber (2008) are subject to sample
selection bias (Core and Larcker 2002, p.333; Cheng and Farber 2008, p.1244). Using
econometric methods such as matched sample or the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure only
mitigates the bias problem. Core and Larcker (2002) and Cheng and Farber (2008) share the
absence of exogenous shock. Without an exogenous shock to managerial ownership, it would be
difficult to identify a relation between managerial ownership and firm performance because the
relation is endogenous. Given the absence of exogenous variation, any findings about the
association between managerial ownership and firm performance are subject to the criticisms
that such a relation may reflect unobservable factors that generate both managerial ownership
and firm performance. This paper overcomes such a limitation and moves the literature forward
by using the 2003 DTC as an unexpected and exogenous shock that provides a stronger
econometric identification of the relations of interest.
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2.2. The 2003 Dividend Tax Cut and Its Impacts on Corporate Behaviors
On May 23, 2003, the U.S. Congress approved the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003. On May 28, 2003, President George W. Bush signed the 2003 TDC
into law. The 2003 DTC sharply reduced the cost of receiving dividends and capital gains for
high income shareholders and thus, increases the value of the stock holdings of firms that pay
dividends (dividend payers). A reduction of individual dividend income tax from a top rate of
38.6 percent to 15 percent raise the after-tax value of a $1 dividend of a high income shareholder
from 61.4 cents to 85 cents, a 38 percent increase. The maximum tax rate on capital gains also
fell from 20 percent to 15 percent. The rationale of the 2003 DTC was that lower tax rates on
dividends would promote investment, spur growth and create more jobs (White House 2003).
The passage of the 2003 DTC was considerably uncertain because it passed the House of
Representatives on May 9, 2003 by a vote of 222 to 203 and the bill passed the Senate on May
23, 2003 with the narrowest possible margin of a 51 to 50 vote.
Several studies have used the 2003 DTC as a natural experiment to learn about the
economic effects of dividend taxation and documented the impacts of the 2003 DTC on
corporate payout policy. Chetty and Saez (2005) find an unusually large number of firms
initiated or increased regular dividend payments in one year after the tax reform. Brown, Liang,
and Weisbenner (2007) investigate whether executive equity ownership affects firm payouts and
find that executives with higher ownership were more likely to increase dividend after the 2003
DTC, whereas no relation is found for the periods before the tax reform. Blouin, Raedy and
Shackelford (2011) find that directors rebalanced their portfolios to maximize after-tax returns to
respond to the 2003 TDC. Together, the findings in Chetty and Saez (2005), Brown, Liang, and
Weisbenner (2007) and Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2011) suggest that executives quickly
14

responded to the sharp change in the tax treatment of dividend income in 2003 by increasing the
levels of dividend payment and their stock holdings. Aboody and Kasznik (2008) find that after
the 2003 DTC, dividend payers increased the proportion of annual restricted stock grants and
reduced the proportion of annual stock options grant to induce CEOs to pay more dividends.
Overall, the findings in prior literature indicate that there are two sources that increase the value
of holding stocks that pay dividend. The first source comes from more favorable tax treatment.
And the second source comes from an increase in dividend amount. Therefore, I expect that the
2003 DTC will have a positive impact on CEO ownership.
The prior discussion leads to my first hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, as
follows:
H1: CEO ownership of dividend payers significantly increased from 2002 to 2004.
Generally, the change in CEO ownership comes from new restricted stock grants, new
stock option grants, vested option exercises and trading in open-market including share sales and
purchases.3 It is possible that I may not find supporting evidences for the first hypothesis. If
CEOs actively rebalance their equity holdings by selling previously owned shares to diversify
the unsystematic risk associated with concentrating wealth in their firms, the sales will negate the
impact of new equity grants. Thus, whether new equity grants lead to higher CEO equity
ownership also depends on how much equity ownership is rebalanced by the CEOs. Ofek and
Yermack (2000) investigate the impact of stock-based compensation on managerial ownership
by comparing inflows of equity to managers’ portfolios from newly granted restricted shares,
newly granted options, and option exercises and outflows of equity from sales of stock and sales

3

The dynamics of equity flows is presented in more details in Figure 2 in Cheng and Warfield (2005, p.446)
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of stocks converted from option exercises. Their findings suggest that new equity compensation
only succeeds to increase incentives of low-ownership managers. High-ownership managers
actively sell previously owned shares right after receiving new restricted stocks and stock option
grants. For every 1,000 new options awards, high-ownership managers, on average, sell 684
previously owned shares to reduce undiversified risk associated with wealth concentration.
Moreover, Ofek and Yermack (2000) also find that for executives who exercise stock options,
regardless of the level of prior ownership, almost all the new shares are disposed. It means that if
CEOs sell their previously owned shares and the number of shares in the sales is greater than the
total number of shares they receive from new equity grants and from option exercises, the total
CEO ownership will decrease. Thus, whether CEOs choose to diversify away the unsystematic
risk associated with a greater concentration of wealth in their firm’s stocks by selling previously
owned shares, or to accept higher risk exposure associated with wealth concentration to receive
the favorable treatment of the 2003 DTC appears to be an empirical question.
Similarly, option exercises may or may not influence total CEO ownership. On the one
hand, if CEOs exercise vested options and keep the shares received from option exercises, their
equity ownership will rise. On the other hand, if CEOs exercise vested options and dispose all
the shares acquired from option exercises, their equity ownership will fall. The empirical
evidences in Ofek and Yermack (2000) suggest that regardless of their prior ownership level, all
executives who exercise stock options dispose of almost all of the shares acquired. Again,
whether CEOs choose to diversify away the unsystematic risk associated with a greater
concentration of wealth in their firm’s stocks by disposing of the shares received from option
exercises, or to accept higher risk exposure by keeping those shares converted from options to
receive the favorable treatment of the 2003 DTC is still an empirical question.
16

Recall that the main purpose this study is to re-examine the relation between CEO equity
ownership and firm performance in a natural experiment of the tax reform – the 2003 DTC.
Suppose that I find evidences that the 2003 DTC did have a positive impact on CEO ownership,
the next question that arises is whether and how changes in CEO ownership lead to changes in
firm performance.
To answer how changes in CEO ownership would lead to changes in firm performance, I
use R&D investment as a channel through which ownership would influence firm performance.
My selection of R&D investment channel is based on the theoretical prediction of Demsetz and
Lehn (1985) and empirical evidences in prior research such as Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006),
Core and Guay (1999), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Cheng and Farber (2008).
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that executive ownership plays a more significant and
important role in determining firm performance when firms operate in a noisy environment, high
information asymmetry, or invest heavily in risky projects and intangible assets (Demsetz and
Lehn 1985, p.1158-1160). Since most of the investment in R&D is intangible assets, R&D firms
are considered to have high information asymmetry, managerial discretion and presumably high
agency problem. To control for agency problem, R&D firms tend to rely more on ownership than
other corporate governance such as board of director (Demsetz and Lehn 1985).
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) examine the relation between changes in CEO equity
incentives and risk-taking behavior, measured by R&D investment. Their findings suggest that
CEOs increase R&D investment when their wealth becomes more sensitive to their firm stock
volatility. Controlling for the level of stock holdings, a compensation structure that contains
more options would lead to higher sensitivity to stock volatility, and therefore would encourage
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CEOs to increase risky investment. They also document that controlling for sensitivity to stock
volatility, a compensation structure that contains more stocks would lead to lower R&D
investment.
Core and Guay (1999) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) provide theoretical framework
and empirical evidence that stock-based compensation is designed to induce managers to take a
desired level of effort and to increase risk taking incentives. Changes in equity ownership, thus,
will lead to changes in risk taking decisions of managers. Cheng and Farber (2008) argue that
“restatement firms had excessive risky investments in the pre-restatement period due to high
level of equity compensation and that the reduction in option compensation in the postrestatement period decreased the level of these investments” (Cheng and Farber 2008, p.1244).
Based on the argument and evidences documented in prior research, I expect to find
changes in risk-taking behavior, measured by R&D investment, of the CEOs of dividend payers
in my sample, after the 2003 DTC. The evidences documented in Coles, Daniel and Naveen
(2006) suggest that the relation between changes in CEO equity ownership and R&D investment
could be positive or negative, depending on the relative proportion of CEO stock and stock
options holdings.
If there is an increase in CEO ownership after the 2003 DTC and such an increase comes
from the form of higher stock options, then I would expect to find an increase in the level of
risky investments. However, if CEO ownership increases because CEOs have higher level of
restricted stock holdings then I would expect to find a decrease in the level of risky investments,
ceteris paribus. Since the changes in CEO ownership and R&D investment could go in either
positive or negative direction, I do not have a directional prediction in advance and let the data
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shows us empirical evidences. This leads to my second hypothesis, stated in the alternative form,
as follows:
H2: Changes in CEO ownership are associated with changes in the level of risky
investments.
Core and Guay (1999) argue that due to the changes in economic determinants of
managerial optimal ownership levels and the costs of continuously re-contracting, managerial
ownership may not always be optimal. It means that CEOs may over- or under-own their firms at
a certain point. If the exogenous shock of the 2003 DTC had a positive impact of CEO
ownership, the level of some CEO ownership would move closer to the optimal levels if these
CEOs under-owned their firms prior the shock, while some other CEO ownership levels – of
those CEOs who over-owned or owned the optimal level of their firms prior to the shock –
would then [post shock] deviate from the optimal levels. Based on the prediction of Core and
Guay (1999) optimal ownership model and the empirical evidences in Core and Larcker (2002)
and Cheng and Farber (2008), I expect to find that dividend payers whose CEO ownership
moves closer to the optimal levels after the shock will experience an improvement in subsequent
investment and firm performance, but dividend payers whose CEO ownership deviates from the
optimal after the shock will experience deterioration in subsequent investment and firm
performance. This argument leads to third hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, as follows:
H3: More optimal CEO ownership is associated with higher investment efficiency.
Finally, to answer the question whether changes in CEO ownership are associated with
changes in firm performance, I extend the findings in Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li (2013) and argue
that more optimal CEO ownership leads to improvement in firm performance through an
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improvement in investment efficiency. This argument leads to my fourth and last hypothesis,
stated in the alternative form, as follows:
H4: Higher investment efficiency is associated with improvement in firm performance.
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3. Sample and Data
I obtain a balanced sample of CEOs with no missing total compensation data from the
Execucomp database.4 I use financial statement data from Compustat North America and stock
return data from Center for Research in Security Prices. I exclude financial and utility firms and
firms with missing data on total assets and R&D expenses. I select the sample with no-missing
data on R&D to serve two purposes. First, executive ownership plays significantly more
important role in firms operating in noisier environment, has a significant amount of intangible
assets and exposes to riskier investments such as research and development (Demsetz and Lehn
1985, p.1158-1160). Since most of the investment in R&D is intangible assets, R&D firms are
considered to have high information asymmetry, managerial discretion and presumably high
agency problem. To control for agency problem, R&D firms tend to rely more on ownership than
other corporate governance such as board of director (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). Thus, using
R&D investment sample provide stronger setting to examine the role of CEO ownership in firm
performance. Second, using R&D investment sample enables me to test the last two hypotheses
by examining the change in risk-taking behavior of CEOs measured as the change in R&D
investment and the direct outcome of their R&D investment measured as the number of patents
granted.
To estimate the optimal ownership model, I limit the sample period between 2002 and
2006 because I aim to investigate the change in CEO ownership in one year pre and post the
2003 DTC and investigate the one and two years post investment and performance consequences
of the change in CEO ownership. After these screening procedures, my final sample consists of

4

I keep the sample balanced (constant) over the sample period between 2002 and 2006 to eliminate the impact of
CEO turn-overs and change in dividend payout policy such as dividend initiation or omission on executive
compensation, investing decisions and firm performance. Thus, balanced sample provides a stronger setting to test
my hypotheses.
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2,720 CEO-year observations from 544 unique firms in 41 industries between 2002 and 2006.
The sample consists of 1,235 CEO-year observations from 247 unique dividend payers and 1,485
CEO-year observations from 297 unique non-dividend payers. In the test for Hypotheses 3, I
further limit my sample to firms that have available patent data shared by Professor Amit Seru
from The University of Chicago.5 All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom
percentiles.

5

https://iu.app.box.com/patents
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4. Changes in CEO Ownership around the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
This Section presents the research design and the test results of the first hypothesis.
4.1. CEO Ownership
I follow Core and Guay (1999) and define CEO ownership as the natural logarithm of the
proportion of shares outstanding held by a CEO plus the proportion of shares outstanding in
options held by a CEO times the Black-Scholes hedging delta.

Ownership  log[

# Shares  # Options  Delta
]
# CommonShares

(1)

where, #Shares is the total number of shares held by CEO, #Options is the total number of
options outstanding held by CEO, #CommonShares is the total number of common shares
outstanding, and Delta is the Black-Scholes hedging delta, computed as:

Delta 

OptionValue
 e dT N ( Z )
Price

Z  [log( S / X )  T ( r  d   2 / 2)] /  T 1/2

(2)

(3)

where N is the cumulative probability function for the normal distribution, S is the price of the
underlying stock, X is the exercise price of the option,  is the expected stock-return volatility
over the life of the option, r is the risk-free interest rate that I obtained from the Federal Reserve
on their website for “Treasury constant maturities”6, T is time to maturity of the options in years,
and d is the expected dividend rate over the life of the option.

6

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm

23

4.2. Optimal Ownership Model
I compute an ownership benchmark by constructing a regression model comparable to
those models used by Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Core and Larcker (2002)
where the dependent variable in the regression is the natural logarithm of CEO ownership. “This
transformation enables us to interpret the residuals as the percentage by which actual ownership
deviates from expected ownership” (Core and Larcker 2002, p.326).
The benchmark model for the level of managerial ownership is as follow:7
Ownershipit   0  1Sizeit   2 Size 2it   3Volatilityit   4Volatility 2it   5PPEit   6 RDAdvertiseit
  7CashFlowit  8 MTBit   9 Leverageit  YearDummies  IndustryDummies   it

(4)

where Ownership is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of the proportion of shares
outstanding plus the proportion of shares outstanding in options times the Black-Scholes delta
hedge ratio, specified in Equation 1. Size is natural logarithm of total market value where market
value is the product of total common shares outstanding and the market price at fiscal year-end.
Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of stock returns estimated over the 60 months prior
to the beginning of the fiscal year. PPE is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to total
assets. R&D and Advertising is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses and
advertising expenses to total assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of operating cash flows to total assets.
MTB is the ratio of total market value to total assets. Leverage is total debts divided by total
7

I do not include firm fixed effects because Zhou (2001) argues that firm fixed effects estimators may not detect an
effect of ownership on subsequent performance even when such a relation exists. I also estimated the ownership
model specified in Core and Larcker (2002, p.327) but the explanatory power of their model in our sample is much
lower (9.2 percent). Thus, I follow the suggestions of Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Zhou (2001) to
include more explanatory variables into the model. These variables are Size squared to capture the non-linear
relation between ownership and firm size, PPE, RDAdvertise, Cash Flow and Leverage to capture the monitoring
costs and the agency costs of free cash flows.
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assets. Year Dummies are year binary indicator variables for 2002 to 2005. Industry Dummies
are 40 industry indicator variables.
I expect to find a negative coefficient for Size because the same proportion of ownership
becomes more expensive and thus more difficult to hold when firm size increases (β1 < 0).
Similar to Core and Larcker (2002), I also expect that managerial ownership will increase at a
decreasing rate as monitoring costs increase (β3 > 0 and β4 < 0). The squared terms of Size and
Stock return volatility are included in the model to capture their non-linear relation with
ownership (Core and Larcker 2002). Investment in fixed capital is observable and easier to
monitor. Thus, similar to Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), I expect to find lower
managerial ownership in firms with a greater concentration of fixed or “hard” capital in their
investments as measured by PPE (β5 < 0). I do not have a predicted sign for R&D and Advertise
(β6) because R&D and Advertise could be positively or negatively associated with managerial
ownership. If we consider R&D and Advertise as less observable investments, and more difficult
to monitor, then a positive relation between R&D and Advertise and managerial ownership is
expected. However, higher managerial ownership may also motivate a manager to reduce
expenditure in risky investment such as R&D and Advertise to unload undiversified risk
associated with the performance of their firm stock. As suggested by Jensen (1986), firms with
more cash flows are more likely to have higher agency costs and require higher levels of
monitoring ownership. Thus, I expect to find a positive coefficient of Cashflow (β7 >0). Similar
to Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Core and Larcker (2002), I use MTB as proxy for
growth opportunities and expect that firms with greater growth opportunities will require higher
levels of ownership (β8 > 0). I do not have a predicted sign for Leverage (β9) because this
variable can be either negatively or positively related to managerial ownership. On the one hand,
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Leverage can be a monitoring tool to reduce the agency cost of free cash flows and therefore
reduce the desired level of managerial ownership (Jensen 1986). On the other hand, high
ownership managers may become entrenched when they have more power in their firm (Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny 1988), and therefore, firms use more debts as a monitoring tool to balance
the entrenchment costs. To control for industry factors, I include industry dummies. To capture
potential temporal differences in managerial ownership, I include year dummies.
I define Deviation as the absolute value of the residuals obtained from Equation 4 then
use the difference in absolute values of Deviation in 2002 and 2004 to separate the 247 dividend
payers into two subsamples: More Optimal (114 CEOs) and Less Optimal (133 CEOs). CEOs
belong to More Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is greater than the
absolute value of Deviation in 2004. CEOs belong to Less Optimal subsample if the absolute
value of Deviation in 2002 is less than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004. This research
design allows me to capture the changes in ownership and Deviation of ownership in 2004
compared to 2002 as well as the cross-sectional variation in the changes in ownership and
Deviation of ownership.8
Since this is a two-stage methodology, one may concern whether the model specification
from the first stage is appropriate. I acknowledge the debate in the extant literature about the
determinants of managerial ownership. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) suggest
including firm fixed effects while Zhou (2001) points out some drawbacks of the firm fixed
effects model and argues that firm fixed effects estimators may fail to detect an effect of
ownership on firm performance even when such a relation exists because managerial ownership
8

Since the passage of the 2003 DTC was not anticipated until May of 2003 and changes in executive compensation
contracts are usually determined at fiscal year ends, it is unlikely that managers would fully respond to the change in
legislation in 2003. That is why my one year pre- and post-event is 2002 and 2004, accordingly.
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changes slowly over time. Resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this study. The model
specification in the first stage to estimate the expected CEO ownership level is based on the
theoretical models of Core and Larcker (2002) and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), but
excluding firm fixed effects (as suggested by Zhou 2001). My model specified in Equation 4
shares a similar limitation with the models of Core and Larcker (2002) and Himmelberg,
Hubbard and Palia (1999) and is subject to the criticism of the omitted variable problem because
we cannot exhaust the possibilities of omitted variables in any empirical specification.
To mitigate the problem of omitted variables, I conduct the second-stage analysis using
difference-in-difference approach. If there is a variable omitted from Equation 4, it is unlikely
that this variable has the exact cross-sectional variation with the change in CEOs ownership and
change in firm performance in both the sample of interest (dividend payers) and the control
group sample (non-dividend payers).
Table 1: Optimal Ownership Regression
Dependent variable
Independent variable
Size
Size squared
Stock return volatility
Stock return volatility squared
PPE
R&D and Advertising
Cash flow
MTB
Leverage

Predicted sign

Ownership

t-statistics

-

-0.676***
0.006
2.364***
-1.337***
-0.275
-0.861
0.095
0.009
0.223

-4.45
0.67
3.56
-2.49
-1.14
-1.46
0.21
0.18
1.15

+
+/+
+
+/-

Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects

Yes
Yes

N
Adjusted R2

2,720
39.15%

Note: This table summarizes regression results from estimating Equation 4. The sample consists of 2,720 CEO-year
observations for the period between 2002 and 2006. The dependent variable is Ownership. Ownership is defined as
the natural logarithm of the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding plus the proportion of shares outstanding in
options times the Black-Scholes delta hedge ratio. Size is natural logarithm of total market value where market value
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is the product of total common shares outstanding and the market price at fiscal year end. Size squared is square of
Size. Stock return volatility is the annualized standard deviation of stock returns estimated over the 60 months prior
to the beginning of the fiscal year. Stock return volatility squared is square of Stock return volatility. PPE is the ratio
of plant, property and equipment to total assets. R&D and Advertising is the ratio of the sum of research and
development expenses and advertising expenses to total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of operating cash flows to total
assets. MTB is the ratio of total market value to total assets. Leverage is total debts divided by total assets. t-statistics
are robust to heteroskedasticity and in the last column. Coefficients of the intercept, year indicators, and industry
indicators are not shown. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentiles. Statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.

Table 1 summarizes regression results from estimating Equation 4, which indicate that
the ownership model for CEO Ownership is statistically significant (p<0.0001), with adjusted R2
of 39.15 percent. All of the t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-tailed. The log of
the CEO Ownership is negatively related to firm size but positively related to firm size squared.
These results are consistent with my expectation and the findings in Himmelberg, Hubbard and
Palia (1999, p.369, Table 4, columns 1 and 2). I also find a concave relation between log of CEO
Ownership and stock return volatility. The log of CEO Ownership is positively and significantly
associated with stock return volatility but significantly and negatively related to stock return
volatility squared. The results are consistent with the results reported in Table 3, page 328 in
Core and Larcker (2002). PPE, R&D Advertising expenses, Cash Flow, MTB coefficients have
expected signs but are insignificant. R&D and Advertising expenses and PPE variables are also
insignificant in most of the estimations in Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999). Overall, the
optimal ownership regression model provides consistent results with prior research.
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4.3. Descriptive Statistics
Panels A and B of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the ownership and
ownership determinants for 544 unique firms (247 unique dividend payers and 297 unique nondividend payers) between the sample period from 2002 to 2006. Dividend payers are larger
(natural logarithm of the firm market value is 8.11) than non-dividend payers (natural logarithm
of the firm market value is 7.09), p-value of the difference is 0.05. Non-dividend payers have
significantly higher stock return volatility and risky investment (measured by R&D and
Advertising expenses) than dividend payers. Dividend payers tend to invest more in fixed assets
(PPE investment on average is 27 percent of total assets) than non-dividend payers (PPE
investment on average is 19 percent of total assets). Dividend payers also have higher cash flows
than non-dividend payers. Cash flows account for 11 percent of total assets of dividend payers
while in non-dividend payers cash flows only account for 9 percent of total assets. Overall,
according to the prediction of the optimal ownership model, the differences in firm
characteristics of dividend payers and non-dividend payers suggest that dividend payers are
expected to have lower CEO ownership than non-dividend payers. Being consistent with this
expectation, on average, CEOs of dividend payers hold 9.50 percent of their firms while CEOs in
non-dividend payers hold 15.28 percent of their firms (p-value of the difference is <0.001). The
expected ownership level of dividend payers is 8.16 percent lower than the expected ownership
level of non-dividend payers (18.82 percent). Over the sample period, CEOs of dividend payers
over-owned their firms by 1.34 percent while CEOs of non-dividend payers under-owned their
firms by 3.54 percent.
Panel C (D) of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of dividend payers in More
(Less) Optimal subsample, respectively. Compared to CEOs in Less Optimal subsample, CEOs
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in More Optimal subsample have significantly lower actual ownership (4.39 percent compared to
14.41 percent) and the difference is significantly difference from zero at 1 percent level. The
expected ownership of CEOs of More Optimal subsample is 7.17 percent and that of the Less
Optimal subsample is 9.15 percent. However, the difference of the expected ownership is
insignificant (p-value is 0.27). The Deviation from optimal ownership of CEOs in More Optimal
subsample is -2.58 percent while that in Less Optimal subsample is 5.26 percent. It suggests that
on average, CEOs in More Optimal subsample under-owned their firms while CEOs in Less
Optimal subsample over-owned their firms. The result from the test of the difference in
ownership Deviation shows that CEOs in Less Optimal subsample deviated significantly further
away from optimal ownership levels than those in More Optimal subsample. Other firm-level
characteristics such as Stock return volatility, PPE, R&D and advertising, Cash flow, MTB and
Leverage of firms in More and Less Optimal subsamples are similar and statistically
insignificantly different.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Dividend Payer Total Sample (N = 1,235)
Mean
Ownership
9.50%
Size
8.11
Stock return volatility
0.37
PPE
0.27
R&D and advertising
0.04
Cash flow
0.11
MTB
1.11
Leverage
0.22
Expected ownership
8.16%
Deviation
1.34%

Std. Dev
35.29%
1.60
0.14
0.15
0.04
0.06
0.74
0.14
19.25%
16.04%

Q1
2.24%
6.81
0.28
0.16
0.01
0.07
0.59
0.12
3.30%
-1.06%

Median
10.13%
8.06
0.33
0.24
0.03
0.10
0.87
0.22
9.05%
2.08%

Q3
39.85%
9.38
0.43
0.35
0.05
0.14
1.39
0.31
17.73%
22.12%

5.03%
6.14
0.43
0.08
0.03
0.04
0.45
0.02
10.65%
-5.62%

26.71%
6.97
0.58
0.14
0.07
0.09
0.73
0.13
20.19%
6.52%

44.93%
7.98
0.76
0.27
0.12
0.15
1.16
0.28
37.16%
7.77%

Q1
1.37%
7.20
0.27
0.16
0.01
0.07
0.56
0.12
2.57%
-1.20%

Median
3.88%
8.61
0.33
0.25
0.03
0.11
0.82
0.21
5.45%
-1.57%

Q3
15.26%
9.85
0.42
0.39
0.05
0.15
1.26
0.31
13.81%
1.45%

Q1
4.88%
6.64
0.28
0.15
0.01
0.06
0.62
0.12
4.88%
-0.00%

Median
19.59%
7.78
0.34
0.24
0.02
0.10
0.94
0.22
10.97%
8.62%

Q3
78.66%
8.89
0.44
0.33
0.04
0.13
1.48
0.32
21.44%
57.22%

Panel B: Non-dividend Payer Total Sample (N = 1,485)
Ownership
Size
Stock return volatility
PPE
R&D and advertising
Cash flow
MTB
Leverage
Expected ownership
Deviation

15.28%
7.09
0.60
0.19
0.08
0.09
0.93
0.16
18.82%
-3.54%

19.59%
1.40
0.22
0.15
0.06
0.08
0.69
0.16
39.06%
19.74%

Panel C: Dividend Payer - More Optimal Subsample (N = 570)
Mean
Std. Dev
Ownership
4.39%
18.26%
Size
8.46
1.64
Stock return volatility
0.37
0.14
PPE
0.29
0.15
R&D and advertising
0.04
0.04
Cash flow
0.11
0.06
MTB
1.04
0.71
Leverage
0.22
0.14
Expected ownership
7.17%
26.48%
Deviation
-2.58%
-8.22%
Panel D: Dividend Payer - Less Optimal Subsample (N = 665)
Ownership
Size
Stock return volatility
PPE
R&D and Advertising
Cash flow
MTB
Leverage
Expected ownership
Deviation

Mean
14.41%
7.82
0.37
0.26
0.04
0.10
1.17
0.22
9.15%
5.26%

Std. Dev
38.67%
1.49
0.14
0.14
0.04
0.06
0.76
0.15
17.40%
21.27%

31

Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for a balanced sample of 1,235 CEO-year observations from 247
unique dividend payers and a sample of 1,485 CEO-year observations from 297 unique non-dividend payers
between the period 2002 and 2006. Panel A (B) presents CEO ownership and firm descriptive statistics of the
dividend (non-dividend) payer sample. Panel C (D) presents the CEO ownership and firm descriptive statistics of
the More (Less) Optimal subsample. Ownership is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of the proportion of
shares outstanding plus the proportion of shares outstanding in options times the Black-Scholes delta hedge ratio.
Size is natural logarithm of total market value where market value is the product of total common shares outstanding
and the market price at fiscal year end. Stock return volatility is the annualized standard deviation of stock returns
estimated over the 60 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. PPE is the ratio of plant, property and
equipment to total assets. R&D and Advertising is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses and
advertising expenses to total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of operating cash flows to total assets. MTB is the ratio of
total market value to total assets. Leverage is total debts divided by total assets. Expected ownership is the expected
value of the ownership dependent variable obtained from the regression results of Equation 4, then converted into
percentage. Deviation is the residuals obtained from the regression results of Equation 4, then converted into
percentage. I use the difference in absolute value of Deviation in 2002 and that in 2004 to separate the 247 dividend
payers into two subsamples: More Optimal (114 CEOs) and Less Optimal (133 CEOs). CEOs belong to More
Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is greater than the absolute value of Deviation in
2004. CEOs belong to Less Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is less than the absolute
value of Deviation in 2004.

4.4. Change in CEO Ownership around the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
The univariate results presented in Figure 1 and Table 3 are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Figure 1 presents the actual and expected levels of Ownership of CEOs of dividend payers (the
lower two lines) and non-dividend payers (the upper two lines) of the sample for the period
between 2002 and 2006. The solid lines present the actual ownership levels and the dotted lines
present the expected (optimal) ownership levels. The expected ownership is the expected value
of the dependent variable Ownership obtained from the regression results of Equation 4, then
converted into percentage. The distance between the actual ownership and expected ownership
levels is ownership Deviation.
The percentage of actual and expected Ownership of CEOs from non-dividend payers is
significantly greater than that of CEOs from dividend payers at 5 percent level for all the years in
my sample period. Such finding is expected because the size of dividend payers is significantly
larger than that of non-dividend payers and as firm size increases, the actual ownership

32

percentage tends to decrease because a similar portion of ownership mechanically becomes more
expensive to hold (Demsetz and Lehn 1985).

24%
22%
20%
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%

18.50%

19.80%

19.08%

17.01%

15.79%

15.59%

14.34%

19.73%
16.11%

14.57%
11.46%

8.73%

8.40%

11.41%

9.67%
9.98%

6.73%

7.20%

6.87%

7.46%

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Actual Ownership of Dividend Payer
Actual Ownership of Non-dividend Payer
Expected Ownership of Dividend Payer
Expected Ownership of Non-dividend Payer

Figure 1: CEO Actual and Expected Ownership between 2002 and 2006
Note: This figure presents the actual and expected Ownership of CEOs in 247 unique dividend payers and 297 nondividend payers in the sample in the period between 2002 and 2006. Ownership is defined as the natural logarithm
of the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding plus the proportion of shares outstanding in options times the
Black-Scholes delta hedge ratio. Expected ownership is the expected value of the ownership dependent variable
obtained from the regression results of Equation 4, then converted into percentage.

There is a significant increase in the actual ownership of CEO from dividend payers after
the 2003 DTC. On average, CEOs in dividend payers held 6.73 percent of their firms in 2002 and
11.41 percent of their firms in 2004. The increase of 4.68 percent ownership is significant at 1
percent level. In contrast, the actual ownership level of CEO from non-dividend payers reduced
by 1.45 percent (15.79 percent actual ownership in 2002 and 14.34 percent actual ownership in
2004) and this change is insignificantly different from zero. The results support my first
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hypothesis that the 2003 DTC had a positive impact on CEO ownership of dividend payers. I
also examined the change in CEO ownership using median values and obtained similar results.
The results are untabulated for the sake of brevity.
For non-dividend payers, the ownership Deviation was rather stable between 2002 and
2004. The Deviation was 2.71 percent in 2002 (18.50 percent actual ownership and 15.79 percent
expected ownership) and 2.67 percent in 2004 (17.01 percent actual ownership and 14.34 percent
expected ownership). In contrary, the ownership Deviation of CEOs in dividend payers
significantly widened from 2.00 percent in 2002 (8.73 percent actual ownership and 6.73 percent
expected ownership) to 4.54 percent in 2004 (11.41 percent actual ownership and 6.87 percent
expected ownership). The increase in Deviation of dividend payers between 2002 and 2004
suggests that the increase in actual ownership from 6.73 percent in 2002 to 11.41 percent in 2004
is suboptimal. On average, CEOs of dividend payers had moved from under-owning their firms
to over-owning their firms. According to the prediction of the optimal ownership model,
suboptimal ownership is associated with poorer firm performance.
To provide more insight about the change in actual and expected ownership of dividend
payers around the 2003 DTC, I separate 247 dividend payers into two subsamples based on the
change in Deviation from optimal ownership level between 2002 and 2004: 114 More Optimal
and 133 Less Optimal firms. Firms belong to More (Less) Optimal subsample if the absolute
values of Deviation from 2002 is greater (less) than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004.
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Figure 2: CEO Actual and Expected Ownership of Dividend Payer in More and Less Optimal Subsamples between 2002 and
2006
Note: This figure presents the actual and expected Ownership of CEOs in 114 unique dividend payers in More Optimal subsample and 133 unique dividend
payers in Less Optimal subsample in the period between 2002 and 2006. Ownership is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of the proportion of shares
outstanding plus the proportion of shares outstanding in options times the Black-Scholes delta hedge ratio. Expected ownership is the expected value of the
ownership dependent variable obtained from the regression results of Equation 4, then converted into percentage. Deviation is the residuals obtained from the
regression results of Equation 4, then converted into percentage. I use the difference in absolute value of Deviation in 2002 and that in 2004 to separate the 247
dividend payers into two subsamples: More Optimal (114 CEOs) and Less Optimal (133 CEOs). CEOs belong to More Optimal subsample if the absolute value
of Deviation in 2002 is greater than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004. CEOs belong to Less Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002
is less than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004.
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Figure 2 presents the actual and expected ownership of dividend payers in More Optimal
subsample (the left chart) and Less Optimal subsample (the right chart). The solid lines present
the actual ownership level and the dotted lines present the expected ownership level estimated
from regression specified in Equation 4. The actual ownership levels of CEOs increased
significantly between 2002 and 2004 for both More and Less Optimal subsamples (p-values are
0.01). The level of actual ownership of CEOs in dividend payers in More Optimal subsample
increased from 2.34 percent in 2002 to 6.73 percent in 2004. And the level of actual ownership
of CEOs in dividend payers in Less Optimal subsample increased from 11.12 percent in 2002 to
16.08 percent in 2004. It is worth to note that although the actual ownership levels of CEOs in
More and Less Optimal subsamples are significantly different at 5 percent level, the expected
ownership levels of CEOs in these two subsamples are not significantly different during the
period between 2002 and 2006.
CEOs in More Optimal subsample under-owned their firms in 2002, 2003, 2005 and
2006 and slightly over-owned their firms in 2004. The 2003 DTC impact had move the actual
ownership of CEOs in More Optimal subsample closer to the optimal levels. Ownership
Deviation significantly narrowed from 6.30 percent in 2002 (the difference between 8.64 percent
actual ownership and 2.34 percent expected ownership) to 0.87 percent in 2004 (the difference
between 6.73 percent actual ownership and 5.86 percent expected ownership) with p-value of the
change is 0.001. The increase in actual ownership of CEOs in More Optimal subsample after the
2003 DTC had moved these CEOs from a less optimal position to a more optimal ownership
position. According to the prediction of the optimal ownership model, More Optimal subsample
firms should experience an improvement in firm performance after the 2003 DTC.
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On the other hand, CEOs in Less Optimal subsample over-owned their firms from 2002
to 2006. By holding more equity in their firms after the 2003 DTC, CEOs in the Less Optimal
subsample deviated further away from the optimal ownership levels. The ownership Deviation
significantly increased by almost 4 times. The ownership Deviation was 2.31 percent in 2002
(the difference between 11.12 percent actual ownership and 8.81 percent expected ownership)
and was 8.21 percent in 2004 (the difference between 16.08 percent actual ownership and 7.87
percent expected ownership) with p-value of the change is 0.001. According to the prediction of
the optimal ownership model, Less Optimal subsample firms should experience poorer
performance after the 2003 DTC.
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Table 3: Change in Actual CEO Ownership and CEO Ownership Deviation from Optimal
Levels between 2002 and 2004
Panel A: Comparison of Change in CEO ownership between Dividend Payers and Non-dividend Payers
p-value
Actual CEO Ownership
2002
2004
(2004 - 2002)
(2004-2002)
Dividend Payer
6.73%
11.41%
4.68%
0.01
(N = 247)
Non-dividend Payer
15.79%
14.34%
-1.45%
0.21
(N = 297)
Difference in differences
CEO Ownership Deviation
From Optimal Level
Dividend Payer
(N = 247)
Non-dividend Payer
(N = 297)

6.13%

0.001

2002

2004

Absolute value
(2004 – 2002)

p-value
(2004-2002)

-2.00%

4.54%

2.54%

0.06

-2.71%

-2.67%

0.04%

0.87

2.50%

0.08

Difference in differences

Panel B: Comparison of Change in CEO ownership between Dividend Payers More and Less Optimal
Subsamples
p-value
Actual CEO Ownership
2002
2004
(2004 – 2002)
(2004-2002)
More Optimal Subsample
2.34%
6.73%
4.39%
0.01
(N = 114)
Less Optimal Subsample
11.12%
16.08%
4.96%
0.01
(N = 133)
Difference in differences
CEO Ownership Deviation
From Optimal Level
More Optimal Subsample
(N = 114)
Less Optimal Subsample
(N = 133)

-0.57%

0.89

2002

2004

Absolute value
(2004 – 2002)

p-value
(2004-2002)

-6.30%

0.87%

-5.43%

0.001

2.31%

8.21%

5.90%

0.001

11.33%

<0.001

Difference in differences

Note: This table reports the means of actual CEO Ownership and CEO Ownership Deviation from optimal levels of
247 Dividend Payers and 297 non-dividend payers in Panel A and of dividend payers in More and Less Optimal
Subsamples in Panel B for the years 2002 and 2004 (one year pre and post the DTC event). Actual CEO Ownership
is defined as the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding plus the proportion of shares outstanding in options
times the Black-Scholes delta hedge ratio. Expected ownership is the expected value of the ownership dependent
variable obtained from the regression results of Equation 4, then converted into percentage. CEO Ownership
Deviation is the residuals obtained from the regression results of Equation 4, then converted into percentage. I use
the difference in absolute value of Deviation in 2002 and that in 2004 to separate the 247 dividend payers into two
subsamples: More Optimal (114 CEOs) and Less Optimal (133 CEOs). CEOs belong to More Optimal subsample if
the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is greater than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004. CEOs belong to Less
Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is less than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004.
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Overall, the 2003 DTC had a significant impact on CEO ownership of dividend payers in
both More and Less Optimal subsamples but did not have impact of CEO ownership of nondividend payers. The results are consistent with the prediction of the first hypothesis. The
expansion in ownership Deviation in 247 dividend payers after the 2003 DTC was driven by 133
dividend payers in the Less Optimal subsample, not by the 114 dividend payers in the More
Optimal subsample.
4.5. Channels for the Change in CEO Ownership
The change in CEO ownership generally comes from four channels:
(1) new restricted stock grants;
(2) new stock option grants;
(3) vested option exercises by CEOs; and
(4) CEO trading in open-market including share sales and purchases.
The changes through the first two channels are fulfilled by the board of directors while
the changes through the last two channels are accomplished by the CEOs themselves.9 To
provide more insights about how CEO ownership increased after the 2003 DTC, I examine
changes in CEO ownership associated with each of these four channels.
Execucomp database provides data about equity ownership including vested and unvested
shares and options held directly by CEOs and annual compensation data including restricted
stock and stock option grants. To examine the change in CEO ownership from the first, second
and third channels, I use annual compensation and option exercise data from Execucomp

9

Change in total number of shares owned from 2002 to 2004 = Number of restricted shares granted in 2002 and
2004 + Number of vested option exercised in 2002 and 2004 + Open market purchases in 2002 and 2004 – Open
market sales in 2002 and 2004.

39

database. For the last channel, since Execucomp does not provide data of CEO’s trading in open
market, I examine the change in total number of shares owned between 2002 and 2004 to
indirectly estimate the net impact of open market sales/purchases on CEO ownership. I examine
the changes of new restricted stock grants, new stock option grants, vested option exercises and
total number of shares owned between 2002 and 2004 using difference in difference approach
with non-dividend payers as control group. The difference in difference approach controls for the
impact of time-invariant firm characteristics and temporal trend in CEO compensation (Murphy
1999).
I measure the change in restricted stock grants and stock option grants in two different
ways: (1) as the change in dollar value; and (2) as the change in percentage of total
compensation. In Table 4, Panels A and C report the changes in dollar value and Panels B and D
report the changes as percentage of total compensation.
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Table 4: Changes in CEO Ownership through New Stock and New Option Grants
Panel A: Comparison between Dividend Payers and Non-dividend Payers: Annual Equity Grants at Dollar Value
Stock Grant
Stock Grant
∆ Annual Stock Grant
Option Grant
Option Grant
∆ Annual Option Grant
2002
2004
(2004 – 2002)
2002
2004
(2004 – 2002)
Dividend Payers (1)
$812,912
$1,230,650
$417,738***
$3,035,090
$2,281,410
-$753,680***
(N = 247)
Non-dividend Payers (2)
$388,165
$225,263
-$162,902
$2,758,200
$2,846,020
$87,820
(N = 297)
Difference in differences
$580,640***
-$841,500***
(1) - (2)
Panel B: Comparison between Dividend Payers and Non-dividend Payers: Annual Equity Grants at Percentage of Total Compensation
Stock Grant
Stock Grant
∆ Annual Stock Grants
Option Grant
Option Grant
∆ Annual Option Grant
2002
2004
(2004 – 2002)
2002
2004
(2004 – 2002)
Dividend Payers (1)
8.307%
12.382%
4.080%***
40.389%
29.165%
-11.220%***
(N = 247)
Non-dividend Payers (2)
21.608%
4.273%
-17.340%***
51.572%
44.782%
-6.790%***
(N = 297)
Difference in differences
21.410%***
-4.430%***
(1) - (2)
Panel C: Comparison between Dividend Payers in More and Less Optimal Subsamples: Annual Equity Grants at Dollar Value
Stock Grant
Stock Grant
∆ Annual Stock Grant
Option Grant
Option Grant
∆ Annual Option Grant
2002
2004
(2004 – 2002)
2002
2004
(2004 – 2002)
More Optimal (1)
$745,137
$1,014,440
$269,303*
$3,869,800
$1,809,770
-$2,060,030***
(N=114)
Less Optimal (2)
$871,006
$1,402,880
$531,874**
$2,873,460
$2,319,560
-$553,900*
(N=133)
Difference in differences
-$262,571
-$1,506,130***
(1) - (2)
Panel D: Comparison between Dividend Payers in More and Less Optimal Subsamples: Annual Equity Grants at Percentage of Total Compensation
Stock Grant
Stock Grant
∆ Annual Stock Grant
Option Grant
Option Grant
∆ Annual Option Grant
2002
2004
(2004 – 2002)
2002
2004
(2004 – 2002)
More Optimal (1)
8.084%
10.140%
2.060%*
36.812%
25.389%
-11.420%***
(N=114)
Less Optimal (2)
9.016%
14.168%
5.150%**
44.593%
33.906%
-10.690%***
(N=133)
Difference in differences
-3.100%
-0.740%
(1) - (2)
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Note: Panel A (B) of this table presents the mean difference in CEO annual equity grants in year 2002 and 2004 for
247 dividend payers and 297 non-dividend payers in dollar value (percentage of total compensation). Panel C (D) of
this table present the mean difference in CEO annual equity grants of 114 dividend payers in More Optimal
subsample and 133 dividend payers in Less Optimal subsample. CEO Ownership Deviation is the residuals obtained
from the regression results of Equation 4, then converted into percentage. I use the difference in absolute value of
Deviation in 2002 and that in 2004 to separate the 247 dividend payers into two subsamples: More Optimal (114
CEOs) and Less Optimal (133 CEOs). CEOs belong to More Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation
in 2002 is greater than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004. CEOs belong to Less Optimal subsample if the
absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is less than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004. Non-dividend payers are
used as controls. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

Panel A of Table 4 presents the change in restricted stock grants and stock option grants
of CEOs in dividend payers and non-dividend payers at dollar value and Panel B presents such
changes in percentages of total compensation. Overall, the results suggest that dividend payers
substitute stock option grants by restricted stock grants. On average, restricted stock grants of
CEOs in dividend payers increased significantly by $417,738 from 2002 to 2004. Stock option
grants of CEOs in dividend payers reduced significantly by $753,680. Both restricted stocks and
stock options are considered equity-based compensation. However, the expected values of
restricted stocks and stock options differ significantly regarding changes in dividend. Dividend
payments increase the expected value of restricted stocks but reduce the expected value of stock
options. The favorable tax treatment of the 2003 DTC induced dividend payers to re-design the
annual compensation package to their CEOs by increasing more restricted stock grants and
reducing stock option grants. The changes in annual restricted stock grants and stock option
grants between 2002 and 2004 of dividend payers are significant at 5 percent level. Compared
with non-dividend payers, dividend payers rewarded significantly more restricted stocks and
fewer stock option grants. The differences in the changes of restricted stock grants between
dividend payers and non-dividend payers are $580,640 in dollar amount and 21.41 percent as
percentage of total compensation, respectively. Compared to non-dividend payers, dividend
payers reduced stock options grant value by $841,500 and the reduction is equivalent to 4.43
percent of total compensation.
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Panels C and D of Table 4 present the mean differences of annual restricted stock and
stock option grants of CEOs of dividend payers in More and Less Optimal subsamples. Overall,
the results suggest that dividend payers in both subsamples follow similar compensation policy
by increasing restricted stock grants and reducing stock option grants. Dividend payers in the
More Optimal subsample reduced the option grants in their CEO annual compensation package
by $2,060,030 (11.42% of total compensation) while dividend payers in the Less Optimal
subsample reduced the options grants in their CEO annual compensation package by $553,900
(10.69% of total compensation).
To test for the change in CEO Ownership through the last two channels (net of openmarket trading and stock option exercises), I adopt the difference-in-difference approach. I
compute the change in total shares held by CEOs in dividend payers from 2002 to 2004. This
change controls for the impact of time-invariant factors on CEO stock holdings. I then compare
this change to the change in the total shares held by CEOs in non-dividend payers over the same
period. Using non-dividend payers as a control is to control for the temporal trend in CEO share
holdings. Next, I compare the change in the total number of options exercised from 2002 to 2004
of dividend payers and non-dividend payers.
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Table 5: Changes in CEO Ownership through Option Exercises and Open-market Trading Activities
Panel A: Comparison between Dividend Payers and Non-dividend Payers – Dollar Value

Dividend Payers (1)
(N = 247)
Non-dividend Payers (2)
(N = 297)
Difference in differences
(1) - (2)

Option Exercise
2002
$1,127,280

Option Exercise
2004
$3,739,820

∆ Option Exercise
(2004 – 2002)
$2,612,540***

Shares Owned
2002
$26,369,720

Shares Owned
2004
$32,783,160

∆ Shares Owned
(2004 – 2002)
$6,413,440**

$1,684,710

$2,267,850

$583,140*

$3,062,310

$3,389,870

$327,560

$2,029,400***

$6,085,880***

Panel B: Comparison between Dividend Payers and Non-dividend Payers – Percentage of Total Common Shares Outstanding

Dividend Payers (1)
(N = 247)
Non-dividend Payers (2)
(N = 297)
Difference in differences
(1) - (2)

# Option Exercise
/#Shares
Outstanding 2002
0.512%

# Option Exercise
/#Shares
Outstanding 2004
2.488%

∆(# Option Exercise
/#Shares Outstanding)
(2004 – 2002)
1.976%***

# Shares Owned
/#Shares
Outstanding 2002
0.802%

# Shares Owned
/#Shares
Outstanding 2004
1.632%

∆(# Shares Owned
/#Shares Outstanding)
(2004 – 2002)
0.830%**

1.860%

1.829%

-0.031%

1.769%

1.771%

0.002%

2.007%***

0.828**

Panel C: Comparison between Dividend Payers in More and Less Optimal Subsamples – Dollar Value

More Optimal (1)
(N=114)
Less Optimal (2)
(N=133)
Difference in differences
(1) - (2)

Option Exercise
2002
$1,045,850

Option Exercise
2004
$4,285,310

∆ Option Exercise
(2004 – 2002)
$3,239,460***

Shares Owned
2002
$10,932,520

Shares Owned
2004
$17,019,790

∆ Shares Owned
(2004 – 2002)
$6,087,270**

$1,382,790

$3,294,580

$1,911,790***

$39,892,230

$49,095,390

$9,203,160**

$1,327,670**

$3,115,890*

Panel D: Comparison between Dividend Payers in More and Less Optimal Subsamples – Percentage of Total Common Shares Outstanding

More Optimal (1)
(N=114)
Less Optimal (2)
(N=133)
Difference in differences
(1) - (2)

# Option Exercise
/#Shares
Outstanding 2002
0.503%

# Option Exercise
/#Shares
Outstanding 2004
2.801%

∆(# Option Exercise
/#Shares Outstanding)
(2004 – 2002)
2.298%***

# Shares Owned
/#Shares
Outstanding 2002
0.405%

# Shares Owned
/#Shares
Outstanding 2004
0.452%

∆(# Shares Owned
/#Shares Outstanding)
(2004 – 2002)
0.047%

0.576%

2.231%

1.655%***

1.275%

2.619%

1.344%***

0.643%
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-1.297%**

Note: This table presents descriptive statistics about CEO total shares holdings and total number of option exercised
during the fiscal year in 2002 and 2004 for 247 dividend payers and 297 non-dividend payers. Total Shares Owned
is total shares owned as reported in Execucomp database. Number of stock option exercised is the total number of
options exercised by the CEO during the year as reported in Execucomp database. *, **, *** indicates significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

The results reported in Panels A and B of Table 5 indicate that the value of options
exercised by CEOs in dividend payers between 2002 and 2004 significantly increased by
$2,612,540. In 2002, the total value of option exercised by CEOs of dividend payers accounts for
0.512% of their firms’ total common shares outstanding. In 2004, the value of option exercised
of these CEOs increased to 2.488% of the value of their firms’ total common shares outstanding.
The value of total shares holdings of CEOs of dividend payers also increased by $6,413,440. In
2002, the value of total shares held by CEOs of dividend payers accounts for 0.802% of the total
common shares outstanding. In 2004, the value of total shares held by CEOs of dividend payers
increased to 1.632%. In contrast, CEOs of non-dividend payers do not change the proportion of
option exercises or shares holdings between 2002 and 2004.
The comparison results between dividend payers’ CEOs in the More and Less Optimal
subsamples are presented in Panels C and D of Table 5. The value of options exercised by the
CEOs in the More Optimal subsample is $1,327,760 higher than that value of CEOs in the Less
Optimal subsample. The change in the value of total shares holding of CEOs in the More
Optimal subsample is $3,115,890 lower than that value of CEOs in the Less Optimal subsample.
My findings suggest that the 2003 DTC gave incentives to CEOs of dividend payers to exercise
more options hold more stocks. The results are in contrast with the findings documented in Ofek
and Yermack (2000) that executives negate the impact of stock-based compensation by selling
previously owned shares when they are granted more restricted stocks and exercise options.
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In sum, I find consistent evidences supporting my first hypothesis that the 2003 DTC has
a positive impact on CEO ownership of dividend payers. After the 2003 DTC, the average equity
ownership of CEOs increased by 4.68 percent. The increase in CEO ownership is completed
through higher restricted stock grants, higher number of stock options exercises and a positive
net change in open market trading.
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5. Changes CEO Ownership and their Impacts on R&D Investment,
Investment Efficiency and Firm Performance
5.1. Impact on R&D Investment: Methodology and Results
To test the second hypothesis that changes in CEO ownership is associated with changes
in the level of risky investment, I use the difference-in-difference approach and examine the
changes in R&D investment of dividend payers in the More and Less Optimal subsamples
between 2002 and 2004 and 2002 and 2005, respectively. Since the change in CEO ownership is
observed in 2004, I use the year 2004 and 2005 to investigate the changes in R&D investment
decision to capture the current and one-year lag of the changes in investment decision of
dividend payers. I first compute the five-year cumulative R&D investment assuming an annual
depreciation rate of 20 percent as in Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) and Lev, Sarath,
and Sougiannis (2005) for each year in the sample period using the following formula:
R & Dit  R & Dit  0.8  R & Dit 1  0.6  R & Dit 2  0.4  R & Dit 3  0.2  R & Dit 4

(6)

where R&Dit denotes firm i’s R&D expenditure in fiscal year t. Then, I regress the
changes in R&D investment on the changes of CEO Ownership, Optimal dummy variable, an
interaction term between CEO Ownership and Optimal dummy variable and other control
variables using the following model:
R & D  0  1Ownership   2Optimal  3Ownership  Optimal  Controls  

(7)

where ∆Ownership is the difference between CEO Ownership in 2002 and 2004, Ownership is
defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding plus the
proportion of shares outstanding in options times the Black-Scholes delta hedge ratio. Optimal is
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a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if dividend payers belong to the More Optimal
subsample and zero otherwise. Dividend payers belong to More Optimal if the difference in
absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is greater than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004,
where Deviation is the residuals obtained from the regression results of Equation 4. Size is
natural logarithm of total market value where market value is the product of total common shares
outstanding and the market price at fiscal year-end. MTB is the ratio of total market value to total
assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Stock return volatility is the annualized
standard deviation of stock returns estimated over the 60 months prior to the beginning of the
fiscal year. Cash flow is the net cash flow scaled by total assets. Capital expenditure is the total
capital expenditure scaled by total assets. Working capital is total working capital scaled by total
assets. I follow prior research (Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2006) to include Size, MTB, Leverage,
Stock return volatility, Cash flow, Capital expenditure and Working capital expenditure as
control variables in regression Equation (7). With this design, the sum of the two coefficients α1
and α3 represents the impact of changes in CEO ownership on changes in R&D investment of
dividend payers in the More Optimal subsample, and the coefficient α1 represents the impact of
changes in CEO ownership on changes in R&D investment of dividend payers in the Less
Optimal subsample. The regression estimation results of Equation 7 are reported in Table 6.
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Table 6: Changes in CEO Ownership and R&D Investment
R & D  0  1Ownership   2Optimal  3Ownership  Optimal  Controls  

Explanatory variable
Intercept
∆Ownership
Optimal
∆Ownership x Optimal
∆Size
∆MTB
∆Leverage
∆Stock return volatility
∆Cash flow
∆Capital expenditure
∆Working capital

Panel A: Change from 2002 to 2004

Panel B: Change from 2002 to 2005

∆R&D

∆R&D

Coefficient
Estimate
-0.0008
-0.0025
0.0060
0.0020
-0.0127
0.0146
0.0051
0.0556
-0.0281
-0.186
0.0042

p-value
0.764
0.001
0.032
0.024
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.760
<0.0001
0.665
<0.0001
0.012

Coefficient
Estimate
-0.0015
-0.0026
0.0055
0.0016
-0.0135
0.0158
0.0039
0.0620
-0.0355
-0.2166
0.0043

p-value
0.633
0.001
0.053
0.061
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.825
<0.0001
0.608
<0.0001
0.021

Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
N
247
247
Adjusted R2
28.05%
28.00%
Note: This table presents the regression results of regressing ∆R&D on ∆Ownership, Optimal ownership indicator
variable and other control variables for 247 dividend payers. In Panel A, the dependent variable, ∆R&D, is measured
as the difference between 5-year accumulative R&D investments in 2002 and 2004. In Panel B, the dependent
variable, ∆R&D, is measured as the difference between 5-year accumulative R&D investments in 2002 and 2005.
The 5-year accumulative R&D investment of 2004 (2005) is computed as the sum of 100% of R&D expenditure in
2004 (2005), 80% of R&D expenditure in 2003 (2004), 60% of R&D expenditure in 2002 (2003), 40% of R&D
expenditure in 2001 (2002) and 20% of R&D expenditure in 2000 (2001) divided by total assets in 2004 (2005).
Ownership is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding plus the proportion
of shares outstanding in options times the Black-Scholes delta hedge ratio. Optimal is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if dividend payers belong to the More Optimal subsample and zero otherwise. Dividend payers belong
to More Optimal if the difference in absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is greater than the absolute value of
Deviation in 2004, where Deviation is the residuals obtained from the regression results of Equation 4. Size is
natural logarithm of total market value where market value is the product of total common shares outstanding and
the market price at fiscal year-end. MTB is the ratio of total market value to total assets. Leverage is total debt
divided by total assets. Stock return volatility is the annualized standard deviation of stock returns estimated over the
60 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. Cash flow is the net cash flow scaled by total assets. Capital
expenditure is the total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. Working capital is total working capital scaled by
total assets. p-values are from one-tailed tests if a prediction is made and two-tailed tests otherwise.

Panel A of Table 6 presents the regression results of Equation 7 where the dependent
variable measures the changes in accumulate R&D investment between 2002 and 2004. In Panel
B, the dependent variable is the difference between accumulative R&D investment between 2002
and 2005. Overall, the regression results of Equation 7 in both Panels A and B of Table 6

49

indicate that changes in ownership is significantly associated with changes in the level of risky
investment, as measured by accumulative R&D investment. It is interesting to note that although
the CEO ownership of dividend payers increased significantly between 2002 and 2004 in both
More Optimal and the Less Optimal subsamples, only CEOs in the Less Optimal subsample
significantly reduced their R&D investments. One percent increase in ownership of the CEOs in
the Less Optimal subsample is associated with the reduction in R&D investment equivalent to
0.25 (0.26) percent in 2004 (2005). In contrast, one percent increase in ownership of CEOs in the
More Optimal subsample is associated with an insignificant decrease in R&D investment in 2004
(2005) equivalent to 0.05% (0.10%) of total assets value. In sum, I find results support my
second hypothesis that changes in CEO ownership is associated with changes in the level of
risky investment as measured by R&D investment in the Less Optimal subsample but not in the
More Optimal subsample.
Since the ownership of non-dividend payers do not change significantly after the 2003
DTC, I do not expect to find a significant associated between changes in CEO ownership of nondividend payers and changes in their R&D investment decisions. I re-examine regression with
changes in R&D is the dependent variable and changes in CEO Ownership, and changes in Size,
MTB, Leverage, Stock return volatility, Cash flow, Capital expenditure and Working capital as
explanatory variables. The untabulated regression results show that there is no statistical
significant relation between changes in ownership and change in R&D investment in the sample
of 297 non-dividend payers.
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5.2. Impact on Investment Efficiency: Methodology and Results
To test the third hypothesis, I use the difference-in-difference research design and
compare the changes in R&D investment efficiency of dividend payers in the More and Less
Optimal subsample between 2004 and 2006, and 2004 and 2007, respectively.
Table 7: R&D Investment Efficiency
Investment Efficiency
2004

Investment Efficiency
2006

Investment Efficiency
2007

0.143

0.163
(<0.0001)
0.083
(0.25)

0.151
(<0.0001)
0.088
(0.33)

0.194
(<0.0001)
0.084
(<0.0001)

0.163
(<0.0001)
0.102
(<0.0001)

0.132
(0.444)
0.077
(<0.0001)

0.131
(0.334)
0.073
(<0.0001)

0.062
(0.0006)
0.007
(0.029)

0.024
(0.0008)
0.029
(0.0014)

Panel A: Total Sample (N = 156)
Total sample
Mean
(p-value)
Median
(p-value)
Panel B: More Optimal Subsample (N = 77)
Mean
(p-value)
Median
(p-value)
Panel C: Less Optimal Subsample (N = 79)
Mean
(p-value)
Median
(p-value)

0.082

0.133
0.068

0.134
0.094

Panel D: Difference between More and Less Optimal Subsamples
Mean
-0.001
(p-value)
(0.951)
Median
-0.026
(p-value)
(0.0003)

Note: This table reports the changes in Investment Efficiency of 156 dividend payers in 2004, 2006 and 2007.
Investment Efficiency is measured by the number of granted patents scaled by two-year lag of the total 5-year
accumulative R&D expenditure. Dividend payers are divided into two subsamples based on the change in Deviation
of CEO ownership between 2002 and 2004, where Deviation is the residuals obtained from the regression results of
Equation 4. Dividend payers belong to the More Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is
greater than that in 2004. Dividend payers belong to the Less Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation
in 2002 is less than that in 2004. Panel A reports Investment Efficiency of the total sample of 156 dividend payers.
Panels B (C) presents Investment Efficiency of 77 (79) dividend payers in the More (Less) Optimal subsample. The
two-tailed p-values reported in Panels A, B and C are from the tests of the change in Investment Efficiency from
2004 to 2006 and to 2007. Panel D reports difference in Investment Efficiency of dividend payers in the More
Optimal and Less Optimal subsamples with one-tailed p-values reported in parentheses.
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To measure R&D investment efficiency, I follow Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li 2013) and
define R&D investment efficiency as a firm’s ability to generate patents per dollar of R&D
expenditure (Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li 2013). Prior studies suggest that patents are the most
important measure of Investment Efficiency (Lev 2001; Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li 2013). I also
allow two-year lag between change in R&D investment and patents granted because on average
it takes two years for the USPTO to grant a patent application (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001).
Since I compute the change in R&D investment in 2004 and 2005, the two-year lag IE is
measured in 2006 and 2007 are IE2006 

# Patents2006
# Patents2007
and IE2007 
, respectively.
R & D2004
R & D2005

The test results for changes in investment efficiency using mean and median values are
reported in Table 7. Panel A reports the difference-in-difference test using the total sample of
156 dividend payers. Compared to their IE 2004, dividend payers experienced significant
increase in IE in 2006 and 2007. One dollar invest in R&D in 2004 generated 0.163 patents
granted in 2006 and one dollar invested in R&D in 2005 generated 0.151 patents granted in 2007.
The improvement in IE in 2006 and 2007 is statistically significant at mean level but is not
significant different at median level.
It is interesting to observe that the results reported in Panels B and C of Table 7 suggest
that the improvement in IE of dividend payers is driven by the firms in the More Optimal
subsample not the firms in the Less Optimal subsample. The dividend payers in the More
Optimal subsample experienced consistent improvement in IE in 2006 and 2007 while the
dividend payers in the Less Optimal subsample experienced a small reduction in IE in 2006 and
2007 at mean level and significant reduction in IE in 2006 and 2007 at median levels. It is worth
to underscore that the changes in IE in 2006 and 2007 of dividend payers are not mechanically
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driven by the fact that these companies increase (or decrease) their investment in R&D because
IE is measured as number patents granted per each dollar invested in R&D. Compared to
dividend payers in the Less Optimal subsample, each dollar invested in R&D investment of
dividend payers in the More Optimal subsample generated 6.2% more patents in 2006 and 2.4%
more patents in 2007 (Panel D, Table 7). Thus, the results support my third hypothesis that more
optimal ownership is associated with more efficient risky investment.
5.3. Impact on Firm Performance: Methodology and Results
In previous sections of this study, first, I document that CEO ownership of dividend
payers significantly increased after the 2003 DTC. Then, I find that the increase in CEO
ownership of dividend payers has asymmetric impact on risky investment decisions (measured
by R&D investment) and on investment efficiency (measured by the number of patents granted).
Only the dividend payers whose CEO ownership moved closer to the optimal level of ownership
experienced an increase in R&D investment and in investment efficiency. The dividend payers
whose CEO ownership moved further from the optimal level of ownership after the 2003 DTC
experienced a significant reduction in R&D investment and investment efficiency.
In this section, I aim to examine whether more optimal ownership is associated with
better firm performance through investment efficiency improvement. To test the last hypothesis
that higher investment efficiency is associated better firm performance, I first look at whether the
accounting operating performance measured by return on asset (ROA) is statistically positive
when the investment outcomes are observed (in 2006 and 2007). I follow the suggestion of
Barber and Lyon (1996) to develop a comparison benchmark by using the industry and
performance match. For each dividend payer in my sample, I select a match firm in the same 2
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digit SIC industry with the closest accounting operating performance in 2004. I also require that
the control firm’s ROA be between 90 percent and 110 percent of the dividend payer’s ROA. The
process yields 227 control firms satisfying the matching requirements. To provide robustness for
the test, I compute ROA using both operating income after depreciation and operating income
before depreciation.
My matching procedure is successful in creating a match sample whose 2004 operating
performance is insignificantly different from that of the dividend payers in my sample of interest.
The Excess ROA in 2004 and 2005 of 227 dividend payers is insignificantly different from zero.
Overall, dividend payers underperformed their benchmark firms in 2006 but outperformed their
benchmark firms in 2007 at both mean and median levels (Panel A, Table 8). On average, in
2006, dividend payers statistically underperformed the ROA of the benchmark firms by a mean
(median) of 0.31 (0.09) percentage points. In 2007, dividend payers outperformed the ROA of
their benchmark firms by a mean (median) of 0.71 (0.53) percentage points. I obtain similar
results when using operating income before depreciation to compute ROA.
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Table 8: Operating Performance – Excess ROA
Year

N

Mean

p-value

Median

p-value

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.00%
-0.37%
-0.09%
0.53%

0.76
0.11
0.17
0.0001

0.00%
-0.52%
-0.21%
0.32%

0.61
0.09
0.09
0.10

0.00%
0.13%
0.92%
1.91%

0.15
0.28
<0.0001
<0.0001

0.00%
0.06%
0.60%
1.41%

0.38
0.83
0.0013
0.10

0.00%
-0.81%
-0.60%
-0.34%

0.42
<0.0001
0.002
0.06

-0.02%
-0.88%
-0.98%
-0.84%

0.29
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.006

Panel A: Total dividend payer sample
Excess ROA computed using operating income before depreciation
2004
227
0.00%
0.93
2005
227
0.57%
0.77
2006
226
-0.31%
0.09
2007
226
0.71%
0.0003
Excess ROA computed using operating income after depreciation
2004
227
0.00%
0.85
2005
227
-0.82%
0.76
2006
226
-0.13%
0.08
2007
226
0.36%
0.07
Panel B: Dividend payer – More Optimal subsample
Excess ROA computed using operating income before depreciation
2004
105
0.01%
0.57
2005
105
0.22%
0.35
2006
105
1.38%
<0.0001
2007
105
1.95%
<0.0001
Excess ROA computed using operating income after depreciation
2004
105
0.01%
0.60
2005
105
0.13%
0.58
2006
105
1.10%
<0.0001
2007
105
1.71%
0.08
Panel C: Dividend payer – Less Optimal subsample
Excess ROA computed using operating income before depreciation
2004
122
0.02%
0.69
2005
122
-1.16%
<0.0001
2006
121
-0.67%
0.002
2007
121
-0.41%
0.10
Excess ROA computed using operating income after depreciation
2004
122
-0.11%
0.49
2005
122
-1.64%
<0.0001
2006
121
-1.20%
<0.0001
2007
121
-0.87%
0.007
Panel D: Difference between More Optimal and Less Optimal subsamples
ROA computed using operating income before depreciation
2004
105/122
0.30%
0.38
0.51%
0.62
2005
105/122
0.98%
0.002
0.35%
0.13
2006
105/121
1.49%
<0.0001
1.06%
<0.0001
2007
105/121
1.78%
<0.0001
2.04%
<0.0001
ROA computed using operating income after depreciation
2004
105/122
0.61
0.07
1.18%
0.30
2005
105/122
1.29%
<0.0001
0.67%
0.01
2006
105/121
1.68%
<0.0001
0.92%
<0.0001
2007
105/121
1.95%
<0.0001
1.71%
<0.0001
Note: This table presents excess operating performance of dividend papers between 2004 and 2007. I calculate
excess ROA by using the matched-firm approach of Barber and Lyon (1996), where the matching firm is non-
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dividend paying firm in the same 2-digit SIC industry with the closest operating performance in 2004 and by using
both operating income after depreciation and operating income before depreciation. The total matched sample
consists of 227 dividend payers and non-dividend payer pairs matched in 2004. Panel A presents excess operating
performance of dividend payers compared to their matched non-dividend payers. Panel B (C) presents excess
operating performance of dividend payers in More (Less) Optimal subsample. I use the difference in absolute value
of Deviation in 2002 and that in 2004 to separate 227 dividend payers into 105 More Optimal and 122 Less Optimal
firms. Deviation is the residuals obtained from the regression results of Equation 4. Firms belong to More Optimal
subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is greater than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004. Firms
belong to Less Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is less than the absolute value of
Deviation in 2004. Panel D presents the difference in operating performance between dividend payers in More and
Less Optimal subsamples.

After separating dividend payers into two subsamples, the More and Less Optimal
subsamples, I observe significantly different results. Only firms in the More Optimal subsample
consistently outperformed their benchmark firms in 2006 and 2007. More Optimal ownership is
associated with consistent improvement in operating performance. Dividend payers in More
Optimal subsample statistically outperformed the ROA of their benchmark firms in 2006 by a
mean (median) of 1.38 (0.92) percentage points and in 2007 by a mean (median) of 1.95 (1.91)
percentage points. In contrast, dividend payers in Less Optimal subsample statistically
underperformed the ROA of their benchmark firms in 2006 by a mean (median) of 0.67 (0.60)
percentage points and then continued to underperform by a mean (median) of 0.87 (0.84)
percentage points in 2007. Comparing the ROA between dividend payers in More and Less
Optimal subsamples, I find that on average the More Optimal dividend payers consistently beat
the Less Optimal dividend payers in 2006 and 2007 by 1.49 and 1.78 percentage points,
accordingly. The results are robust when ROA is computed by using income before depreciation
and using income after depreciation. These results are consistent with the last hypothesis that
investment efficiency is positively associated with firm performance.
In the second test of the last hypothesis, I assess whether the stock price returns of
dividend payers in my sample statistically positive over the 12- and 24-month periods after the
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improvement in investment efficiency is observed. I follow Barber and Lyon (1997) and Mitchell
and Stafford (2000) and use buy-and-hold excess returns (Excess BHAR) to measure long-term
stock performance as follow:

BHARi   t 1 (1  Rit )   t 1 (1  RPortfolio,t )
T

T

(8)

where the indices i and t correspond to firm and month, respectively, R is monthly return. The
first month, t=1, is the first month in fiscal year 2006. I create a matching portfolio for each
dividend payers in my sample from a list of all CRSP firms based on size measured as market
value as of the end of June 2006 and book-to-market equity (BTM) as of the last book value
reported prior to June 2006. I follow Fama and French (1997) and define book equity as total
shareholders’ equity, minus preferred stock, plus deferred taxes, plus investment tax credit, plus
postretirement benefit liabilities. Missing data are set to zero. Each dividend payer is matched to
its corresponding portfolios using the 5x5 size/BTM breakpoints from Dr. Kenneth French’s
website.10 Delisted firms are retained during 2006 and 2007 to avoid survivorship bias by
including delisting returns and investing the proceeds in the matching size/BTM portfolio. Then,
I follow Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and compute the value-weighted average of the individual
BHARs based on market value at the end of 2005, scaled by the level of the CRSP valueweighted weights. This procedure eliminates the problem arising from unstandardized value
weights that over-weight more recent observations. Out of 247 dividend payers, 226 firms have
data available to use in the matching process.

10

http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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Table 9: Stock Performance
Year

N

(1)

(2)

Mean
BHAR
(3)

p-value
(4)

Median
BHAR
(5)

p-value
(6)

Panel A: Total dividend payer sample
2006
226
2.72%
0.05
0.92%
0.25
2006 and 2007
224
4.79%
0.05
1.85%
0.27
Panel B: Dividend payer – More Optimal subsample
2006
105
5.36%
0.01
2.18%
0.03
2006 and 2007
105
7.57%
0.04
2.38%
0.04
Panel C: Dividend payer – Less Optimal subsample
2006
121
-0.46%
0.81
-0.66%
0.51
2006 and 2007
119
0.52%
0.59
-0.32%
0.66
Panel D: Difference between More Optimal and Less Optimal subsamples
2006
105/121
5.82%
<0.001
2.84%
0.02
2006 and 2007
105/119
7.05%
0.004
2.70%
0.05
Note: This table presents the stock market performance of dividend payers in 2006 and 2007. I calculate excess
stock returns using portfolio-matched-buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs), where return benchmark is the
returns on corresponding value-weighted size and book to market portfolio constructed by Fama and French 1993.
Panel A reports the mean and median values of excess BHAR of total dividend payers. Panel B (C) reports the mean
and median values of excess BHAR of dividend payers in subsample of More (Less) Optimal. Panel D presents the
test statistics of the differences in BHAR at mean and median values between dividend payers in More and Less
Optimal subsamples. I use the difference in absolute value of Deviation in 2002 and that in 2004 to separate the 213
dividend payers into two subsamples More and Less Optimal subsamples, where Deviation is the residuals obtained
from the regression results of Equation4. Dividend payers belong to More Optimal subsample if the absolute value
of Deviation in 2002 is greater than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004. Dividend payers belong to Less
Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is less than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004.

Table 9 presents the stock return performance results. Dividend payers in More Optimal
subsample statistically outperformed their benchmark portfolios in 2006 and 2007 with a mean
Excess BHAR of 5.36 percent and 7.57 percent, respectively, and a median of 2.18 percent and
2.38 percent, respectively (Panel B, Table 9). In contrast, the Excess BHARs of dividend payers
in Less Optimal subsample are -0.46% at mean level and -0.66% at median level of 2006, and
0.52% at mean level and -0.32% at median level in 2007 (Panel C, Table 9). Compare to
dividend payers in the Less Optimal subsample, dividend payers in the More Optimal subsample
consistently outperformed by 5.82% in 2006 and 7.05% in 2006 and 2007.
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In sum, the results reported in Tables 8 and 9 support my last hypothesis that higher
investment efficiency is significantly associated with better firm performance. My empirical
results are in line with the evidences documented in Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li (2013).
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6. Summary and Conclusions
This study examines the relation between CEO ownership and firm performance using a
large tax cut on dividend income enacted in 2003 (the 2003 DTC) as an exogenous shock. The
2003 DTC significantly increased the value of dividend income by 38% from tax savings. I
document that the 2003 DTC has a significantly positive shock on CEO ownership of firms that
pay dividends (dividend payers) by increasing their CEO ownership from 6.73% in 2002 to
11.41% in 2004. The increase in CEO ownership of dividend payers come from three difference
channels: new restricted stock grants in annual compensation package, stock options exercised
by CEOs, and net positive open-market trading by CEOs.
Following the theoretical framework developed in Core and Guay (1999) and Core and
Larcker (2002), I expect that more optimal ownership is associated with improvement in firm
performance. I argue that higher ownership does not necessarily lead to better performance. It is
the optimal level of ownership that determines firm performance and one of the important
channels to improve firm performance is improvement in R&D investment.
I follow Core and Guay (1999) and define CEO ownership as the natural logarithm of the
proportion of shares outstanding held by a CEO plus the proportion of shares outstanding in
options held by a CEO times the Black-Scholes hedging delta. Using an optimal ownership
model as a benchmark, I measure the change in distance to optimal ownership level for CEOs of
dividend payers between 2002 and 2004 (one year pre- and post-the 2003 DTC). I develop an
ownership benchmark by constructing a regression model comparable to those models used by
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Core and Larcker (2002) where the dependent
variable in the regression is the natural logarithm of CEO Ownership. Dividend payers in my
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data sample are divided into two subsamples: More Optimal and Less Optimal based on the
changes in the absolute value of the residuals obtained from the ownership benchmark
regression. Firms belong to More Optimal subsample if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002
is greater than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004. Firms belong to Less Optimal subsample
if the absolute value of Deviation in 2002 is less than the absolute value of Deviation in 2004.
I first document that the 2003 DTC has a positive impact on CEO ownership of dividend
payers in both the More and Less Optimal subsample. However, the increase in CEO ownership
has asymmetric impact on risky investment decision and investment efficiency outcomes in each
subsample. Using difference-in-difference approach to examine the change in R&D investment
efficiency measured by the number of patents granted per each dollar of R&D investment, I find
that More Optimal dividend payers experienced significant improvement in investment
efficiency and firm performance (measured by ROA and BHARs) while Less Optimal dividend
payers did not.
This paper contributes to the extant literature in several important ways. First, this paper
extends the literature on the relation between managerial equity ownership and firm performance
by showing that CEO ownership is significantly associated with firm performance through the
improvement in risky investment decisions. My empirical results shed light on the theoretical
prediction of the optimal ownership model developed by Core and Guay (1999) that higher
ownership does not always lead to improvement in firm performance. It is the distance to
optimal ownership level that is the important determinant of firm performance improvement.
More optimal ownership is associated with improvement in risky investment decisions and firm
performance. Second, I provide empirical evidences on how CEO ownership increased after the
2003 DTC. My results show that CEO ownership increased after the 2003 DTC through new
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restricted stock grants, more option exercised by CEOs and positive net open-market trading by
CEOs. Third, my findings that higher CEO ownership has an asymmetric impact of risky
investment extend the findings documented in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). I document that
although dividend payers in the More and Less Optimal subsamples both significantly reduced
option grants after the 2003 DTC, only dividend payers in the Less Optimal subsample reduced
their investment in R&D. In contrast, dividend payers in the More Optimal subsample even
increased their R&D investment. My findings highlight the importance of the prior level of CEO
ownership before the shock and the distance to optimal ownership in determining risk-taking
behaviors of CEOs. This study also extends the findings of Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) by
providing empirical evidences about the outcome of the changes in CEOs’ risk taking decisions.
Last but not least, the paper extends a growing literature on the impacts of dividend taxes on
corporate behaviors by showing that changes in dividend taxes have significant impact on
compensation decisions by boards of directors and on the total equity ownership of CEOs. Tax
policy makers, corporate board of directors, shareholders, academic researchers and those who
are interested in the relation between executive compensation and firm performance would find
the findings of this study interesting and meaningful.
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